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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
Case No. 880422-CA
Category 2

vs.
COLIN K. HAMILTON,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

JURISDICTION
This

Court

has

jurisdiction

over this appeal pursuant to

U.C.A. Section 78-2a-3(2)(c).
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a bench trial in which the Defendant,
Colin Hamilton,
of alcohol

was found

in violation

Judge specifically
motor vehicle
The Trial

guilty of driving under the influence
of U.C.A.

Section 41-6-44.

The Trial

found that the Defendant had been operating a

with a

blood alcohol

content of

.08 or greater.

Judge further indicated that he had a reasonable doubt

as to whether the Defendant was intoxicated to

a degree

that he

could not operate a motor vehicle safely.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Respondent believes
for review would be

that Appellant's

governed by

first issue presented

U.C.A. Section

77-35-17(g), in

particular subsections (3), (4) and (5), which are set out in the
Page 1

addendum, attached to the end of this brief*
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.
to as

The Defendant, Colin K.
"Hamilton" was

11:00 p.m., driving a

Hamilton, hereinafter referred

pulled over

April 2, 1988, shortly before

truck

had

that

no

tail

lights. (Trial

Transcript, p. 4.)
2.

After

observing

the

odor

Harrison, hereinafter referred to
to

complete

several

field

Based on

the

sobriety tests.

field

Hamilton under arrest for DUI.
4.

After

arriving

at

Hamilton had

was asked to remove the
"filled out

sobriety

Rick

asked Hamilton

Hamilton indicated

tests, Harrison placed

(Trial Transcript, p. 7.)
thfc Sheriff's Department, Hamilton

a lifesaver

lifeseiver,

some paperwork,

Deputy

(Trial Transcript, p. 5-6.)

and the Jailer, Paul Adams, hereinafter
observed that

alcohol,

as "Harrison",

that he had had something to drink.
3f

of

and

referred to

as "Adams",

in his mouth.
upon

Hamilton

removal, Harrison

waited the 15 minutes, and then had

Mr. Hamilton take the intoxilyzer test".

(Trial

Transcript, p.

7, lines 13-19.)
5.
period.
6.

Harrison observed Hamilton during the 15 minute waiting
(Trial Transcript, p. 16, line 19.)
The time of arrest was recorded as being

2300.

(Trial

Transcript, p. 13, lines 2-4.)
7.
2310.
8.

Adams searched the vehicle Hamilton had been driving at
(Trial Transcript, p. 13.)
The intoxilyzer test given
Page 2

to Hamilton

began at 2322.

(Trial Transcript, p. 17, lines 8-10.)
9.

The clock

used to determine the time of arrest was not

the clock used to time the 15 minutes between the
lifesaver

and

the

beginning

of

removal of the

the intoxilyzer test.

(Trial

Transcript, p. 17, lines 15-17.)
Adams1 watch was used to

10.
period.

(Trial Transcript,

time

the

15

minute waiting

p. 20, lines 1-10, and p. 21, lines

12-17.)
11.

The 15 minute

waiting

the vehicle.

(Trial

search of

period

began

prior

to Adams1

Transcrip:, p. 22, lines 20-25,

and p. 23, lines 15-20.)
12.

Both

Adams

and

Harrison

testified

that

15 minutes

elapsed between the lifesaver beihg spit out and the beginning of
the intoxilyzer test.

(Trial Transcript,

p. 7,

lines 13-17; p.

17, lines 4-5; p. 21, lines 16-17; p. 24, lines 19-22; and p. 32,
lines 3-17.)
13.

During the

objected to

course

of

the

trial, Hamilton's Counsel

the admission of the results of the intoxilyzer test

on the basis of Baker's 15 minute waiting period requirement four
(4) times.
14.

As

(Trial Transcript, p. 9, 18, 20 and 24.)
part

of

permission to voir dire
ruling

on

the

cross-examine."
15.
rested

the

first

the witness

objection,

objection,

Counsel asked for

and the

Court withheld any

until Counsel had "an opportunity to

(Trial Transcript, p. 9, lines 2-12.)

After the voir dire, and further questioning, the State

and

moved

for

the

admission

Page 3

of

the

test

results.

Hamilton's Counsel objected that the 15 minute waiting period had
not been established.
16.

The

(Trial Transcript, p. 18, lines 10-18.)

Court

replied

"That's

Counsel moved to exclude the test.

The

right",

and

State moved

Hamilton's
to re-open.

Hamilton's Counsel objected as the State had just rested.

(Trial

Transcript, p. 18, lines 18-25.)
17.
that it
results.

The Court ruled that the State could re-open and stated
had not

ruled on

the State's

motion to admit the test

(Trial Transcript, p. 18, line 25, and p.

29, lines 1-

2.)
18.

Hamilton's

Counsel

objected

a

third time during the

State's examination of Deputy Paul A. Adams.

(Trial Transcript,

p. 20, lines 17-21.)
19.

After Adams'

testimony, the

State moved

test results and Hamilton's Counsel objected
fourth time.

to admit the

to the

admission a

(Trial Transcript, p. 24, lines 23-25, p. 25, lines

1-10.)
20.

The Court ruled that the 15 minute time

requirement of

Baker had been shown and admitted the test results into evidence.
(Trial Transcript, p. 25, lines 19-22, and p. 33, lines 3-17.)
21.

The Court found

Section 41-6-44,

Hamilton

operating a

guilty

of

violating U.C.A.

motor vehicle with a blood alcohol

content of .08 or greater, based

on Hamilton's

results showing a bJood alcohol level of .17.
p. 41, lines 1-16.

Page 4

intoxilyzer test
(Trial Transcript,

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The State will argue that the Trial Court committed no error
and that

there was sufficient evidence to support its finding of

guilty.

In particular, the State will argue

not abuse
its

its discretion

case,

and

admissibility

that
of

a

that the

Court did

in allowing the prosecution to re-open

the

foundational

breath

requirements

for

the

test in accordance with Baker, were

complied with.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
A.

THE TRIAL COURT DID
RE-OPEN ITS CASE

IN ALLOWING

THE STATE TO

THE TRIAL COURT HAS DISCRETION AS TO THE ORDER OF
PROOF AND IN DETERMINING WHETHER TO GRANT A MOTION
TO RE-OPEN

The order

that a

by U.C.A. Section
Criminal

NOT ERR

criminal trial should proceed ds governed

77-35-17(g),

Procedure.

It

Rule

provides

offer evidence in support of the

17

of

the

Utah

Code of

that the prosecution should

charge.

After the prosecution

has rested, the defense should present its case.
may offer rebutting evidence "unless the

Then, each side

court, for

good cause,

otherwise permits.11, [U.C.A. Section 77-35-17(g)(5)].
ln

State

v. Greqorious,

Defendant was charged with
against nature.

grounds,

then

After

made

including

accomplice, and

having

16 P.2d

committed

893 (1933), the

an

infamous crime

The prosecution1s only witness was the victim, a

15 year old boy.
defense

81 U.33,

a

his testimony,
Motion

that

rested.

The

for a Directed Verdict on several

the

therefore his

the State

prosecution's

witness

was

an

testimony required corroboration.

Page 5

The State indicated that because of
no corroboration was necessary.
a recess was taken.
open its

After

the victim's

youth, it felt

There was further discussion and

the recess,

the State

asked to re-

case and introduce corroborating evidence.

The defense

objected, but the Court allowed the State to re-open its case and
give further

evidence.

The Supreme

Court held

within the discretion of the court to permit
opened.

No abuse

that "(i)t was

the case

to be re-

of discretion is shown in doing so."

16 P.2d

at 895.
In both Gregorious and
the defense

raised an

requirements

for

this case,

objection to

admissibility.

requirements for

ensure the evidence's

State rested,

the evidence based on legal
In

the admissibility

after the

both

cases,

the

legal

of evidence were designed to

creditability.

Ir

both

cases,

if the

evidence were excluded, there would be no basis for conviction of
the Defendant.

In

prosecution

re-open

clearly

to

complied

admissability of
to.

In both

Court to

both

cases,
its

with

the

case

the

either

allowed the

legal

requirements

for

the

the evidence originally introduced and objected

cases, it

allow the

case.

Court

and introduce evidence which

was within

case to

the discretion

be re-opened.

able to show an abuse of discretion by
in

Trial

In

of the Trial

The defense was not

the Trial

Court's action

this case, Defendant has argued that the

Court abused its discretion because the evidence was admitted and
Defendant was

convicted based

on that

evidence.

was also the result in the Gregorious case.
Page 6

Clearly, that

It seems likely that

that would be the result in most cases where one party has a need
to re-open its case.

That is not a basis for finding an abuse of

discretion by the Trrial Court,
State v. Greqorious has not been overturned by the courts of
Utah, and was cited with approval in State v. Duncan,

102 U.449,

132 P.2d 121 (1942).
The Utah

ruling in Greqorious is in line with other states.

The only limitation appears to be that the opposing party must be
given

a

fair

and

full

opportunity to rebut the new evidence.

Clearly, Hamilton was given adequate opportunity to cross-examine
the witnesses

and re-butt

the new evidence introduced after the

State re-opened.
In State v. Cutler, 94 Idaho 295, 486 P.2d 1008
Idaho Supreme

Court stated "(i)t is within the discretion of the

trial court to allow
rested and

a party

that decision

to re-open

its case

In State v. Burbank,

156 Me.269,

486 P.2d at 1011•

163 A.2d

639 (I960), the

stated that "(a)justice presiding in a criminal case

not only has the responsibility of
accused of

after it has

will not be disturbed on appeal unless

there is a manifest abuse of such discretion."

Maine Court

(1971), the

crime but

protecting the

rights of one

also an equal responsibility to the people

of the State to the end that justice

is not

thwarted by mistake

or inadvertence."
Also

see

Jones

v.

State,

State v. Loftin, 76 Wash.2d 350
Sage, 20

584 P.2d 224 (Okla.Cr., 1978);
458

P.2d

29

(1969);

State v.

Ore.App. 368, 531 P.2d 707 (1975); State v. Taylor, 112
Page 7

Ariz. 68, 537 P.2d 938, cert, denied 96 S.Ct. 1327, 424 U.S. 921,
47 L.Ed.2d 328 (1975); State v. Carmichael, 240 Kan.149, 727 P.2d
918 (1986); and People v. Green, 164 Cal.Rptr.l,

27 C.3d

1, 609

P.2d 468 (1980) .
B.

THE COURT DID NOT
WERE INADMISSIBLE

Hamilton relies on the
(Trial Transcript,

RULE THAT THE BREATH TEST RESULTS

Court's

comment

of

"That's right"

p. 18, line 18) to support his assertion that

the Court ruled the breath test results inadmissible.
The whole exchange is as follows:
MR. GILLESPIE: State rests, your Honor.
We'd re-move for admission
of the test
results.
MR. SOUVALL:
your Honor, Ifd renew my
objection to the admission. I believe there's been no
competent testimony here that the required 15-minute
period was observed. The deputy said he thought it was
observed, but he can't testify personally that he knew
it was observed, because he didn't time it.
THE COURT:

That's right.

MR. SOUVALL:
exclude the test.

On

that

MR. GILLESPIE:
to re-open, your Honor.

We

would move to be allowed

MR. SOUVALL:

Object.

MR. GILLESPIE:

basis,

I

move to

The State just rested.

Well —

THE COURT:
He may re-open.
I didn't—I
didn't rule upon his motion to admit; that was under
advisement, I hadn't ruled upon it.
He may re-open.
(Trial
lines 10-25, p. 19, lines 1-3.)
Clearly, the

only motion

before the
Page 8

Transcript,

p. 18,

Court when it said "That's

right11 was the State's

Motion to

admit the

test results.

The

Court's comment is in response to Souvall's comment that Harrison
did not time the
opinion, did

15 minute

not consist

a ruling

Souvall felt that more was
exclude the

test.

period,

needed

This motion

already held that the

and,

in

the

Court's own

on the State's Motion.
as

he

immediately

Even

moved to

makes no sense if the Court had

breath test

was inadmissible.

Soxivall's

second objection was based on the fact that the State rested, not
that the Court had already
test.

Clearly, no

ruled

on

the

admissibility

of the

one felt that the Court's comment of "That's

right" consisted a ruling on whether

the test

was admissible or

not at the time of trial.
POINT II. THERE WAS COMPLIANCE WITH THE FOUNDATIONAL REQUIREMENTS
OF THE BAKER RULE
Under State v. Baker,
requires

observation

fifteen

minutes

of

prior

Hamilton's counsel

56 Wash.2d
the

to

846, 355

P.2d 806 (1960)

alleged drunk driver for at least

administering

alleges that

a

intoxilyzer

test.

strict compliance with the rule

is necessary.
A.

WAS THE OBSERVATION REQUIREMENT MET?

In this case,
prior to

1-10).

observed

giving the intoxilyzer test.

7, lines 17-17, and
used to

Harrison

time the

p. 16,

line 19.)

Hamilton

for

15 minutes

(See Trial Transcript, p.
Deputy

Adams' watch was

15 minutes (See Trial Transcript, p. 20, lines

Adams also testified that

15 minutes

Trial Transcript, p. 21, lines 12-17).
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had elapsed

(See

Both Adams1 and Harrison's testimony supports a finding that
Hamilton was
test to

observed by

insure that

Harrison for

absorbed.

alcohol present

in his mouth

State v. Baker, 56 Wash.2d 846, 355 P.2d 806 at

811 (1960).

As Harrison was

had direct,

persoral knowledge

also the

operator of

the test, he

that there was strict compliance

with the foundational requirements
period.

prior to the

Hamilton had not ingested anything into his

mouth or regurgitated and to allow
to be

15 minutes

of

a

15

minute observation

State v. McVay, 83 Or. App. 312, 731 P.23 466 (1987).

B.

DID 15 MINUTES ELAPSE?

In this

case, unlike

State 7.

McVay, 83 Or. App 312,

731

P.2d 466 (1987) cited by Hamilton, Harrison observed Hamilton for
15 minutes

and operated

used to time the test.

the test.

He did not observe the watch

Obviously, Harrison

clock and Harrison at the same time.

by

or

in

the

watch the

The State would allege that

the fact that the watch used to time the 15
owned

could not

minutes need

not be

physical presence of the test operator in

order to make sure Baker's requirements

are met

before the test

is administered.
Hamilton also

alleges that

only 12 minutes elapsed between

the lifesaver being spit out and the beginning

of the

test.

He

bases this conclusion on the time that Adams conducted the search
of Hamilton's vehicle.
the timing

of the

However, the

waiting period

State would
began before

point out that
the vehicle was

searched, and therefore, more than 12 minutes elapsed
test

began,

rather

than

only
PagelO

before the

12 minutes having elapsed.

The

evidence is consistent with

a

finding

by

the

Court

that the

foundational requirements of Baker had been complied with.
"A verdict

will be

overturned only when the evidence is so

lacking and insubstantial that a reasonable person could not have
reached that verdict beyond a reasonable doubt.

This standard of

review is the same whether the finder of fact is a trial judge or
a jury".

(citations

oamitted)

State v. Isaacson, 704 P.2d 555

(Utah, 1985).
CONCLUSION
There is direct competent evidence in
the Court's

findings and

in its ruling.

this case

to support

the Court did not abuse its discretion

Therefore, the Court's decision must be upheld on

appeal.
DATED this 29th day of November, 1988.
ATTORNEYS FOR DUCHESNE COUNTY:
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77-35-16

UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

that persons operating the closed circuit equipment film both the child and the defendant during the child's testimony, so that the jury may
view both the child and the defendant, if that
may be arranged without violation of other requirements of Subsection (2).
(3) In any case concerning a charge of child abuse
or of a sexual offense against a child, the court may
order, upon motion of -he prosecution and for good
cause shown, that the testimony of any witness or
victim younger than 14 years of age be taken outside
the courtroom and be recorded. That testimony is admissible as evidence, for viewing in any court proceeding regarding the charges if the provisions of
Subsection (2) are observed, in addition to the following provisions:
(a) the recording is both visual and aural and
recorded on film or videotape or by other electronic means;
(b) the recording equipment is capable of making an accurate recording, the operator is competent, and the recording is accurate and is not altered;
(c) each voice on the recording is identified;
and
(d) each party is given an opportunity to view
the recording before it is shown in the courtroom.
(4) If the court orders t h a t the testimony of a child
be taken under Subsection (2) or (3), t h e child may
not be required to testify in court a t any proceeding
where the recorded testimony is used.
1988
77-35-16. Rule 16 — Discovery.
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor
shall disclose to the defense upon request the following material or information of which he has knowl-^
edge:
(1) Relevant written or recorded statements of
the defendant or co-defendants;
(2) The criminal record of the defendant;
(3) Physical evidence seized from the defendant or co-defendant;
(4) Evidence known to the prosecutor that
tends to negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate
the guilt of the defendant, or mitigate the degree
of the offense for reduced punishment; and
(5) Any other item of evidence which the court
determines on good cause shown should be made
available to the defendant in order for the defendant to adequately prepare his defense.
(b) The prosecutor shall make all disclosures as
soon as practicable following the filing of charges and
before the defendant is required to plead. The prosecutor has a continuing duty to make disclosure.
(c) Except as otherwise provided or as privileged,
the defense shall disclose to the prosecutor such information as required by statute relating to alibi or insanity and any other item of evidence which the court
determines on good cause shown should be made
available to the prosecutor in order for the prosecutor
to adequately prepare his case.
(d) Unless otherwise provided, the defense attorney shall make all disclosures at least ten days before
trial or as soon as practicable. He has a continuing
duty to make disclosure.
(e) When convenience reasonably requires, the
prosecutor or defense may make disclosure by notifying the opposing party that material and information
may be inspected, tested or copied at specified reasonable times and places.
if) Upon a sufficient showing the court may at any
time order that discovery or inspection be denied, re-

248

stricted, or deferred, or make such other order as is
appropriate. Upon motion by a party, the court may
permit the party to make such showing, in whole or
in part, in the form of a written statement to be inspected by the judge alone. If the court enters an order granting relief following such an ex parte showing, the entire text of the party's statement shall be
sealed and preserved in the records of the court to be
made available to the appellate court in the event of
an appeal.
(g) If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the attention of the court that a
party has failed to comply with this rule, the court
may order such party to permit the discovery or inspection, grant a continuance, or prohibit the party
from introducing evidence not disclosed, or it may
enter such other order as it deems just under the circumstances.
(h) Subject to constitutional limitations, the accused may be required to:
(1) Appear in a lineup;
(2) Speak for identification;
(3) Submit to fingerprinting or the making of
other bodily impressions;
(4) Pose for photographs not involving reenactment of the crime;
(5) Try on articles of clothing or other items of
disguise;
(6) Permit the taking of samples of blood, hair,
fingernail scrapings, and other bodily materials
which can be obtained without unreasonable intrusion;
(7) Provide specimens of handwriting;
(8) Submit to reasonable physical or medical
inspection of his body; and
(9) Cut hair or allow hair to grow to approximate appearance at the time of the alleged offense.
Whenever the personal appearance of the accused is required for the foregoing purposes, reasonable notice of the time and place of such appearance shall be given to the accused and his counsel.
Failure of the accused to appear or to comply with
the requirements of this rule, unless relieved by
order of the court, without reasonable excuse shall
be grounds for revocation of pre-trial release, may
be offered as evidence in the prosecutors case in
chief for consideration along with other evidence
concerning the guilt of the accused and shall be
subject to such further sanctions as the court
should deem appropriate.
i960
77-35-17. Rule 17 — T h e trial.
(a) In all cases the defendant shall have the right
to appear and defend in person and by counsel. The
defendant shall be personally present at the trial
with the following exceptions:
(1) In prosecutions of misdemeanors and infractions, defendant may consent in writing to
trial in his absence; .
(2) In prosecutions for offenses not punishable
by death, the defendant's voluntary absence from
the trial after notice to defendant of the time for
trial shall not prevent the case from being tried
and a verdict or judgment entered therein shall
have the same effect as if defendant had been
present; and
(3) The court may exclude or excuse a defendant from trial for good cause shown which may
include tumultuoi s, riotous, or obstreperous conduct.
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them into court without unnecessary delay or at a
Upon application of the prosecution, the court may
specified time.
require the personal attendance of the defendant at
(j) At each recess of the court, whether the jurors
the trial.
are permitted to separate or are sequestered, they
(b) Cases shall be set on the trial calendar to be
shall be admonished by the court that it is their duty
tried in the following order:
not to converse among themselves or to converse
(1) Misdemeanor cases when defendant is in
with, or suffer themselves to be addressed by, any
custody;
(2) Felony cases when defendant is in custody; other person on any subject of the trial, and that it is
their duty not to form or express an opinion thereon
(3) Felony cases when defendant is on bail or
until the case is finally submitted to them.
recognizance; and
(k) Upon retiring for deliberation, the jury may
(4) Misdemeanor cases when defendant is on
take with them the instructions of the court and all
bail or recognizance.
exhibits and papers which have been received as evi(c) All felony cases shall be tried by jury unless the
dence, except depositions; and each juror may also
defendant waives a jury in open court with the approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution. take with him any notes of the testimony or other
proceedings taken by himself, but none taken by any
(d) All other cases shall be tried without a jury
other person.
unless the defendant makes written demand at least
(1) When the case is finally submitted to the jury,
ten days prior to trial, or the court orders otherwise.
No jury shall be allowed in the trial of an infraction. they shall be kept together in some convenient place
under charge of an officer until they agree upon a
(e) In all cases, the number of members of a trial
verdict or are discharged, unless otherwise ordered by
jury shall be as specified in Section 78-46-5.
the court. Except by order of the court, the officer
(f) In all cases the prosecution and defense may,
having them under his charge shall not allow any
with the consent of the accused and the approval of
communication to be made to them, or make any himthe court, by stipulation in writing or made orally in
self, except to ask them if they have agreed upon
open court, proceed to trial or complete a trial then in
their verdict, and he shall not, before the verdict is
progress with any number of jurors less than otherrendered, communicate to any person the state of
wise required.
(g) After the jury has been impanelled and sworn, their deliberations or the verdict agreed upon.
(m) After the jury h a s retired for deliberation, if
the trial shall proceed in the following order:
they desire to be informed on any point of law arising
(1) The charge shall be read and the plea of the
in the cause, they shall inform the officer in charge of
defendant stated;
them, who shall communicate such request to the
(2) The prosecuting attorney may make an
court. The court may then direct that the jury be
opening statement and the defense may make an
brought before the court where, in the presence of the
opening statement or reserve it until the prosecudefendant and both counsel, the court shall respond
tion has rested;
^
to the inquiry or advise the jury that no further in(3) The prosecution shall offer evidence in supstructions shall be given. Such response shall be report of the charge;
corded. The court may in its discretion respond to the
(4) When the prosecution h a s rested, the deinquiry in writing without having the jury brought
fense may present its case;
before the court, in which case the inquiry and re(5) Thereafter, th«j parties may offer only response thereto shall be entered in the record.
butting evidence u n h s s the court, for good cause,
otherwise permits;
(n) If the verdict rendered by a jury is incorrect on
(6) When the evidence is concluded and at any
its face, it may be corrected by the jury under the
other appropriate time, the court shall instruct
advice of the court, or the jury may be sent out again.
the jury; and
(o) At the conclusion of the evidence by the prose(7) Unless the cause is submitted to the jury
cution, or at t h e conclusion of all of the evidence, the
on either side or on both sides without argument, court may issue an order dismissing any information
the prosecution shall open the argument, the deor indictment, or any count thereof, upon the ground
fense shall follow and the prosecution may close
t h a t the evidence is not legally sufficient to establish
by responding to the defense argument. The the offense charged therein or any lesser included
court may set reasonable limits upon the arguoffense.
1962
ment of counsel for each party and the time to be
77-35-18. R u l e 18 — Selection of j u r y .
allowed for argument.
(a) The clerk shall draw by lot and call the number
(h) If a juror becomes ill, disabled or disqualified
of the jurors that are to try the cause plus such an
during trial and an alternate juror h a s been selected,
additional number as will allow for all peremptory
the case shall proceed using the alternate juror. If no
challenges permitted. After each challenge for cause
alternate has been selected, the parties may stipulate
sustained, another juror shall be called to fill the vato proceed with the number of jurors remaining. Othcancy before further challenges are made, and any
erwise, the jury shall be discharged and a new trial
such new juror may be challenged for cause. When
ordered.
the challenges for cause are completed, the clerk
(i) When in the opinion of the court it is proper for
the jury to view the place in which the offense is shall make a list of the jurors remaining, and each
side, beginning with the prosecution, shall indicate
alleged to have been committed, or in which any
thereon its peremptory challenge to one juror at a
other material fact occurred, it may order them to be
conducted in a body under the charge *>f an officer to time in regular turn, as the court may direct, until all
peremptory challenges are exhausted or waived. The
the place, which shall be shown to them by some perclerk shall then call the remaining jurors, or so many
son appointed by the court for that purpose. The offiof them as shall be necessary to constitute the jury, in
cer shall be sworn that while the jury are thus conthe order in which they appear on the list, and the
ducted, he will suffer no person other than the person
persons whose names are so called shall constitute
so appointed to speak to them nor to do so himself on
the jury.
any subject connected with the trial and to return

